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CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say
What the Law Is
ABSTRACT. Under Marbury v. Madison, it is "emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." But in the last quarter-century, the Supreme Court
has legitimated the executive's power of interpretation, above all in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, the most cited case in modern public law. Chevron is not
merely a counter-Marbury for the executive branch, but also the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins of
the last half-century. It reflects a salutary appreciation of the fact that the law's meaning is not a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" - and that the executive, with its comparative expertise and
accountability, is in the best position to make the judgments of policy and principle on which
resolution of statutory ambiguities often depends. The principal qualification has to do with
certain sensitive issues, most importantly those involving constitutional rights. When such
matters are involved, Congress should be required to speak unambiguously; executive
interpretation of statutory ambiguities is not sufficient.
A U T H O R. Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for many
discussions, to Robert Hahn and Matthew Stephenson for valuable comments, and to
participants in superb legal theory workshops at New York University, the University of Chicago
Law School, and the Yale Law School. Excellent research assistance was provided by Blake
Roberts, Andres Sawicki, Cristina I. Miller-Ojeda, Anne Pogue, and Ken Merber. Valuable
comments were also made by participants in the Symposium at which the essays in this issue
were presented. Special thanks to Steven Calabresi, William Eskridge, and Edward Whelan.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases:
1. Under the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S.
Department of the Interior adopted a broad definition of what it meant to
"harm" a member of an endangered species. A majority of the Supreme Court
rejected a challenge to the Carter-era regulation2 over a dissenting opinion by
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas.'
2. Under the administration of President Bill Clinton, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) asserted authority over tobacco and tobacco products.
The Supreme Court invalidated the FDA's decision.4 Justice Breyer wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.5
3. Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rejected a petition to issue regulations
to control the emission of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles.6
Environmental groups and others challenged the EPA's decision. The court of
appeals rejected the challenge over Judge Tatel's dissent.7
In each of these cases, the relevant statute seemed ambiguous, and
statutory interpretation appeared to be driven by some combination of political
values and assessments of disputed facts. It should be no surprise that when
federal judges disagreed with one another in all three cases, their disagreement
operated along unmistakably political lines - splitting the stereotypically liberal
judges from the stereotypically conservative ones.' There is no reason to
believe that in the face of statutory ambiguity, the meaning of federal law
should be settled by the inclinations and predispositions of federal judges. The
outcome should instead depend on the commitments and beliefs of the
President and those who operate under him.
My major goal in this Essay is to vindicate the law-interpreting authority of
the executive branch. This authority, I suggest, is indispensable to the healthy
1. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
S. Id. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3 d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2oo5), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006). I
do not mean here to express a view on the statutory provisions involved in this case.
7. Id. at 61 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
8. For a similar example, with more complicated debates about interpretive authority, see
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2oo6).
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operation of modern government; it can be defended on both democratic and
technocratic grounds. Indeed, the executive's law-interpreting authority is a
natural and proper outgrowth of both the legal realist attack on the autonomy
of legal reasoning and the most important institutional development of the
twentieth century: the shift from regulation through common law courts to
regulation through administrative agencies. In the modern era, statutory
interpretation must often be undertaken, at least in the first instance, by
numerous institutions within the executive branch.9 For the resolution of
ambiguities in statutory law, technical expertise and political accountability are
highly relevant, and on these counts the executive has significant advantages
over courts. Changed circumstances, involving new values and new
understandings of fact, are relevant too, and they suggest further advantages
on the part of the executive.
Recognition of the executive's interpretive power fits well with the
institutional judgments that are embodied in the post-New Deal willingness to
embrace presidential authority, including the varied forms of administrative
power that are exercised under the President. I shall suggest that recognition of
the executive's interpretive power has the same relationship to the last half of
the twentieth century that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins0 had to the first: an
institutional shift in interpretive power brought about by a realistic
understanding of what interpretation involves. In short, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc." is our Erie. When courts resolve
genuine ambiguities, they cannot appeal to any "brooding omnipresence in the
sky"; 2 often they must rely on policy judgments of their own. Those
judgments should be made by the executive, not the judiciary.13 As we shall see,
the shift from independent judicial judgment to respect for reasonable
interpretations by the executive rests on the same realistic commitments that
9. Throughout this Essay I shall treat the so-called independent agencies (such as the FTC, the
FCC, and the NLRB) as within the executive branch, even though the heads of such
agencies are not at-will employees of the President. Though I use the terms "agencies" and
"executive branch" interchangeably, readers should be aware that some agencies are not
always thought to be within that branch. Because the independent agencies are subject to a
significant degreee of political control, and because they are highly specialized, I believe that
the analysis here applies to them no less than to the more conventionally "executive"
agencies.
10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Mi. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
13. An instructive discussion is Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 11o: An Essay on Context
in Interpretive Theory, 11o HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1797-18oo (1997).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
HeinOnline  -- 115 Yale L.J.  2583 2005-2006
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
led the federal judiciary to abandon "general" federal common law in favor of
respect for state law.
I. MARBURY, COUNTER-MARBURY, AND THE NEW DEAL
Marbury v. Madison holds that it is "emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is."'1 4 The Court does not permit
the executive to interpret ambiguous constitutional provisions as it sees fit.
Courts construe the document independently, not with deference to executive
interpretations of unclear provisions.
Why is the executive not permitted to construe constitutional ambiguities
as it sees fit? The simplest answer is that foxes are not permitted to guard
henhouses, or, in other words, those who are limited by law cannot decide on
the scope of the limitation. Marbury might be said to rest on a theory of
"implicit nondelegation," to the effect that the Constitution is not properly
taken to grant the President (or, for that matter, Congress) the final authority
to interpret its ambiguities. That authority has been granted to the courts.
This judgment - the foundation of Marbuty - has not been uncontroversial.
Foxes should not guard henhouses; but who is the fox? In a famous article,
James Bradley Thayer contended that the Court should uphold democratic
judgments unless they plainly violate the Constitution."5 If we believe that the
interpretation of ambiguous constitutional provisions calls for judgments of
policy and that democratic institutions are in a particularly good position to
make those judgments, then Marbuty is indeed vulnerable. Suppose that
questions of political morality underlie judgments about the legitimacy of
discrimination or the scope of free speech. 6 If so, it is certainly reasonable to
say that constitutional ambiguities should be resolved by those who are most
accountable. But our constitutional tradition has generally rejected Thayer's
view, apparently on the theory that by virtue of their insulation, courts have
comparative advantages in the interpretive domain. 7
14. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
15. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REV. 129 (1893).
16. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 129-39 (20O6) (arguing that judgments of political
morality are involved in constitutional interpretation).
17. For an illuminating defense of Thayerism, arguing for judicial deference to democratic
branches in constitutional law, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 230-
36 (2006).
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It should be easy to see how this view might be transplanted to the arena of
ordinary statutory law. Perhaps statutory law has the same relationship to the
executive as the Constitution has to the government in general. If foxes are not
permitted to guard henhouses, perhaps the executive ought not to be
authorized to interpret the scope of statutes that limit its authority. And
indeed, administrative law doctrines were long built on precisely this
assumption,"8 which continues to play a role in contemporary law.' 9 As we
shall soon see, Chevron selects other foundations.
A. Interpretation as Policymaking
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA),20 the basic charter governing
administrative agencies, was enacted in 1946. The governing provision of the
APA says that the "reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
[and] interpret statutory provisions."2" At first glance, this provision appears to
reassert the understanding that questions of statutory interpretation must be
resolved by courts, not the executive. 2 Although many post-APA decisions
seemed to embrace this understanding, 3 there were important contrary
indications, in which courts suggested that agency interpretations would be
upheld so long as they were rational74
1. Law and Policy
The law remained complex and confused until 1984, when the Court
decided Chevron. The case involved an ambitious effort by the EPA to increase
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
ig. See infra Part II.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 551-557, 701-7o6 (2000).
21. Id. § 7o6.
22. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in.Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 193-
200 (1998).
23. See, e.g., FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981); NLRB v.
Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (i96o); Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB,
353 U.S. 313 (1957); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); Hearst Publ'ns,
322 U.S. iii. For recognition of the ambiguity of the cases, see Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
24. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (198o); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,
441 U.S. 488 (1979); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402,
412 (1941).
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private flexibility under the Clean Air Act." More particularly, the EPA
redefined "stationary source" under the Act so as to include an entire plant,
rather than each pollution-emitting unit within the plant. Upholding the rule,
the Supreme Court created a novel two-step inquiry for assessing agency
interpretations of statutes. The first inquiry is whether Congress has directly
decided the precise question at issue.26 If Congress has not, the second inquiry
is whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible," which is to say
reasonable.27 In the Court's view, Congress had not forbidden a plant-wide
definition of "source"; hence, the EPA could supply whatever (reasonable)
definition it chose.
Strikingly, the Court did not discuss the language or history of the APA. It
did note that Congress sometimes explicitly delegates law-interpreting power
to agencies.28 But the Court could not, and did not, contend that the relevant
provision of the Clean Air Act contained any such explicit delegation. The
Court referred to the possibility that Congress might have wanted the agency
to strike the appropriate balance with the belief "that those with great expertise
and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a
better position to do so." 29 But lacking any evidence on the question, the Court
did not say that the EPA was the beneficiary of an implicit delegation here. On
the contrary, it said that Congress's particular intention "matter[ed] not."3"
Instead the Court offered two pragmatic arguments: judges lack expertise
and they are not politically accountable. In interpreting law, the agency may
"properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is .... "31 The Court was alert to the fact that it was
reviewing a decision made by the Reagan Administration that had altered the
previous interpretation made by the Carter Administration. In the Court's
view, it would be appropriate for agencies operating under the Chief Executive,
rather than judges, to resolve "the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
25. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 712 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 74O1-7671q.
(2000)).
26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
27. Id. at 843.
28. Id. at 843-44.
29. Id, at 865.
30. Id.
31. Id.
2586 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
realities."32
2. Behind Chevron
What is most striking about the Court's analysis in Chevron is the
suggestion that resolution of statutory ambiguities requires a judgment about
resolving "competing interests." This is a candid recognition that assessments
of policy are sometimes indispensable to statutory interpretation. Of course it
is easy to find cases in which courts resolve ambiguities by using the standard
legal sources-for example, by using dictionaries, consulting statutory
structure, deploying canons of construction, or relying on legislative history if
that technique is thought to be legitimate. Under the first step of Chevron, the
executive will lose if the standard sources show that the agency is wrong. But
sometimes those sources will leave gaps or reasonable disagreement; Chevron
itself is such a case, and there are many others.
Suppose, for example, that the question involves the appropriate valuation
of natural resources;33 the proper calculation of Medicare payments; 4 or the
proper extent of deregulation under the Telecommunications Act." If we
emphasize the need to attend to "competing interests," four separate points
support the executive's power to interpret the law. First, interpretation of
statutes often calls for technical expertise, and here the executive has
conspicuous advantages over the courts. The question in Chevron itself was
highly technical, and it was difficult to answer that question without
specialized knowledge. Second, interpretation of statutes often calls for
political accountability, and the executive has conspicuous advantages on that
count as well. When the executive is seeking to expand or limit the Endangered
Species Act or deciding whether to apply the Clean Air Act to greenhouse
gases, democratic forces undoubtedly play a significant role. Third, the
executive administers laws that apply over extended periods and across
heterogeneous contexts. Changes in both facts and values argue strongly in
favor of considerable executive power in interpretation. Unlike the executive,
courts are too decentralized- and their processes far too cumbersome-to do
the relevant "updating," or to adapt statutes to diverse domains. Fourth, it is
often important to permit the modern state to act promptly and decisively.
32. Id. at 865-66.
33. Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 88o F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
34. Univ. Med. Ctr. ofS. Nev. v. Thompson, 38o F. 3 d 119 7 (9 th Cir. 2004).
35- MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
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Deference to executive interpretations promotes that goal far more effectively
than a strong judicial role, for two different reasons. Deference to the executive
reduces the likelihood that judicial disagreement will result in time-consuming
remands to the agency for further proceedings. 6 More subtly, such deference
combats the risk that different lower courts will disagree about the appropriate
interpretation of statutes-and thus counteracts the balkanization of federal
law.3
7
To be sure, it is possible to imagine some tension among these different
considerations. Perhaps an issue calls for specialized competence, but perhaps
the relevant agency has been buffeted about by political pressure imposed by
an administration for which technical considerations are far from primary.3s
Technical and political justifications for Chevron may not march hand-in-hand;
they might well conflict with one another. But so long as the statute is
genuinely ambiguous, and so long as the agency is not acting arbitrarily, it is
entirely legitimate for the executive either to rely on its technical competence or
to make its assessment on the basis of normative judgments that are not
inconsistent with the governing statute.
Notice that so defended, Chevron stands for much more than the modest
claim that courts may not invalidate executive action unless the standard legal
sources require invalidation. Less modestly, Chevron means that courts must
uphold reasonable agency interpretations even if they would reject those
interpretations on their own. Courts must be prepared to say: "If we were
interpreting the statute independently, we would read it to say X rather than Y;
but because it is ambiguous, the executive is permitted to prefer Y." 39 This
36. See JERRY L. MAsHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTo SAFETY 224-31 (1990)
(arguing that remands discourage agency rule-making).
3". See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105-16
(1987) (documenting the balkanization of federal law).
38. For a popular account, see CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 224-47
(2005). Mooney contends that political considerations, not science, have driven policy
judgments in many domains.
39. For those concerned about lack of judicial competence, it would be possible to raise a
second-order objection. If courts are not particularly good at resolving ambiguities when the
resolution turns on a judgment of policy, why should they be thought to be particularly
good at identifying the proper standard of review of executive decisions, a question that
necessarily turns on a judgment of policy? (I am grateful to David Barron for pressing this
question.) The simplest answer is that when Congress has not spoken clearly, courts have
no choice but to decide on the appropriate standard of review. The decision whether to
select the Chevron approach, or some alternative, can be made only by courts, at least in
cases in which Congress has not resolved the problem. (Courts could in principle resolve the
question by asking what the executive would like them to do - second-order Chevron - but
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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argument applies most obviously to the national government, operated by the
Chief Executive, who stands as the most visible official in the United States.
But the same arguments can easily be invoked by other executive officers-
above all, by governors and mayors-who are also entrusted with overseeing
implementation of the law. For state and local officers, just as for federal
officials, statutory ambiguities often cannot be resolved without judgments of
policy. Those judgments should likewise be made by agencies with technical
expertise or political accountability.
As we shall see, it is possible, in some circumstances, to suggest that
statutory ambiguity is not enough-that for some questions, courts ought not
allow the executive to resolve such ambiguities on its own, and that courts
should instead rule that the executive lacks the relevant power unless Congress
grants it expressly. Here we find an important limitation on the executive's
power to interpret statutes, one to which I shall return in due course.
B. Chevron's Fiction: Delegation, Realism, and Institutional Competence
We can now see that Chevron is properly understood as a kind of counter-
Marbury for the administrative state.40 Indeed, it suggests that in the face of
ambiguity, it is emphatically the province of the executive department to say
what the law is. But this understanding raises a large question: What underlies
the rise of this counter-Marbury?
1. Fiction
In the years since Chevron, a consensus has developed on an important
proposition, one that now provides the foundation for Chevron itself: The
executive's law-interpreting power turns on congressional will. 4' If Congress
wanted to repudiate Chevron, it could do precisely that. Before Chevron, some
courts appeared to understand that the deference question was one for
congressional resolution; they approached the deference question on a statute-
by-statute basis, asking whether the relevant statute should be taken to include
the question would remain why courts should choose to answer the question in that way.)
For those who are skeptical of judicial capacities, of course, it would be tempting to seek a
clear congressional judgment on the appropriate judicial approach to executive
interpretations of law, but a congressional judgment is often absent.
40. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283
(1986).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-31 (2001).
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an implicit delegation. 4 In Chevron, the Court replaced that case-by-case
inquiry with a simple rule, to the effect that delegations of rule-making power
implicitly include the power to interpret ambiguities. 43 But as Justices Breyer
and Scalia have independently emphasized, this is a legal fiction;' usually the
legislature has not expressly conferred that power at all. The view that the
executive may "say what the law is" results not from any reading of statutory
text, but from a heavily pragmatic construction, by courts, of (nonexistent)
congressional instructions.
In terms of the standard sources of law, Chevron's fiction is not at all easy to
defend. As noted, the text of the APA appears to contemplate independent
review of judgments of law. Hence the most natural justification for deference
is that certain grants of authority, in organic statutes such as the Clean Air Act,
implicitly contain interpretive power as well. But this argument also runs into
difficulty. At the time the APA was enacted, the bulk of important agency
business was done via adjudication.4" If Congress wanted courts to defer to the
countless interpretations of organic statutes that were produced through
agency adjudication, someone would almost certainly have said so at some
point in the extensive debates., 6 The claim that agency adjudicators (or rule-
makers) have interpretive authority is certainly weakened by the absence of any
contemporaneous suggestions to that effect within Congress itself. Perhaps
subsequent grants of adjudicative or rule-making power, as for example in the
Clean Air Act or the Endangered Species Act, are best taken to confer
interpretive power on the executive. If this is so, the question must be explored
on a case-by-case basis, and it is likely that courts will be unable to find any
clear expression of congressional will to that effect, bringing us back to the
world of fictions.
To say that Chevron rests on a fiction, and one that does not clearly track
congressional instructions, is to acknowledge that the Court's decision on the
42. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
515-16.
43. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); see also
Scalia, supra note 42, at 5i-i6.
44. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370
(1986) (noting the fiction); Scalia, supra note 42, at 517 (same).
45. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 66o (5th ed.
2002).
46. For relevant discussion, see Duffy, supra note 22, at 193-202. Note also that the Attorney
General's Manual relied on by Justice Scalia, supra note 42, at 513, supports the deference
principle. In this particular context, however, the Attorney General's Manual is unreliable,
as it states the views of the executive branch and would naturally be inclined to favor
deference to its own views. See Duffy, supra note 22, at 195-96.
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deference question involves judicial policymaking47 -subject to legislative
override, to be sure, but not rooted in actual legislative judgments. I suggest
that the Court's allocation of interpretive power to the executive should be seen
as an outgrowth of two closely related developments. The first is the legal
realist attack on the autonomy of legal reasoning. The second is the twentieth-
century shift from regulation through common law courts to regulation
through executive agencies.
2. Realists and Realism
The legal realists saw the interpretation of statutory ambiguities as
necessarily involving judgments of policy and principle.4' They insisted that
when courts understand statutes to mean one thing rather than another, they
use judgments of their own, at least in genuinely hard cases. In a famous
article, for example, Max Radin attacked the standard tools as largely
unhelpful. In his view, "[a] legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant
if it were discovered ... is a queerly amorphous piece of slag."'49 Radin said
that, inevitably, a key question was, "Will the inclusion of this particular
determinate in the statutory determinable lead to a desirable result? What is
desirable will be what is just, what is proper, what satisfies the social emotions
of the judge, what fits into the ideal scheme of society which he entertains."I'
Radin's argument was characteristic of the general period in which courts
were being displaced by regulatory agencies. A specialist in administrative law,
Ernst Freund saw at an early stage that for some statutes, "executive
interpretation is an important factor."'" Freund noted, with evident concern,
that "in view of the inevitable ambiguities of language, a power of
interpretation is a controlling factor in the effect of legislative instruments, and
makes the courts that exercise it a rival organ with the legislature in the
development of the written law." 2 After surveying the various sources of
interpretation, Freund emphasized that policy, in the end, must be primary;
47. Thus we find, at the meta-level, the same kinds of considerations to which Chevron is
responsive insofar as that decision sees legal interpretation as involving judgments of policy.
In Chevron itself, the word "source" could not be construed without such judgments; so too
with most of the terms that must be construed in deciding on the appropriate judicial
posture to agency interpretations of law.
48. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 884 (1930).
49. Id. at 872.
so. Id. at 884.
51. Ernst Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 207, 211 (1917).
52. Id. at 208.
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therefore, "in cases of genuine ambiguity courts should use the power of
interpretation consciously and deliberately to promote sound law and sound
principles of legislation." 3
For his part, Karl Llewellyn contended that the standard sources of
interpretation, above all the canons of construction, masked judgments that
were really based on other grounds.54 He asked courts to "strive to make sense
as a whole out of our law as a whole."55 In his view, the canons were plural and
inconsistent, and thus unable to provide real help. Llewellyn argued that
statutory meaning should be derived from "[t]he good sense of the situation
and a simple construction of the available language to achieve that sense, by
tenable means, out of the statutory language. ", 6
Radin, Freund, and Llewellyn overstated their arguments. Canons of
construction, for example, can constrain judicial (or executive) interpretation,
and it may well be better to rely on them than on a judge's individual, general
sense of what is best. But suppose that the realists were broadly right to
suggest that, in the face of genuine ambiguity, courts often make judgments of
policy.' Suppose that in hard cases, the search for "legislative intent" is often a
fraud, and that when courts purport to rely on that intent, they often speak for
their own preferred views .5 If Radin, Freund, and Llewellyn are indeed right,
then there seems to be litde reason to think that courts, rather than the
executive, should be making the key judgments. The President himself should
be in a better position to make the relevant judgments, simply because of his
comparatively greater accountability. And if specialized knowledge is required,
executive agencies have large advantages over generalist judges. In support of
the realist position, consider strong evidence that, for hard statutory questions
within the Supreme Court, policy arguments of one or another sort often play a
53. Id. at 231.
s. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are ToBe Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395-400 (1950).
55. Id. at 399.
56. Id. at 40l.
57. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutoy Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (finding a large role for policy considerations in judicial judgments about
statutory meaning).
58. Not incidentally, the question of deference to executive interpretations itself seems to fall in
this category; it is hard to tease out, from the existing legal materials, an authoritative
legislative judgment on that question, and hence it is necessary, as we have seen, to speak in
terms of legal fictions.
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central role, even in a period in which "textualism" has seemed on the
ascendancy. 9
3. The New Deal and Beyond
These points are easily linked with the post-New Deal transfer of effective
lawmaking power from common law courts to federal bureaucracies. For much
of the nation's history, the basic rules of regulation were elaborated by
common law courts, using the principles of tort, contract, and property to set
out the ground rules for social and economic relationships. In the early part of
the twentieth century, some of those rules were taken to have constitutional
status, so as to forbid legislative adjustments. 60 But in a wholesale attack on the
adequacy of the common law, the New Deal saw the rise and legitimation of a
vast array of new agencies, including the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Social Security
Administration (SSA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an expanded Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), and an expanded Food and Drug Administration (FDA).61
Many of the agencies were necessarily in the business of interpreting
ambiguous statutory provisions; indeed, interpretation was the central part of
their job. Agency-made common law dominated the early days of the
administrative state. 62 To take just one example, the NLRB was required to
decide a number of fundamental questions about national labor policy. The
statute did not speak plainly, and questions of policy were inevitably
involved.6 3 While the federal courts also played a significant and sometimes
aggressive role,6 the elaboration of the labor enactments of the New Deal was
inevitably founded on the work of the NLRB. What can be said for the NLRB
can also be said of the FDA, the FCC, the SEC, and the FTC, all of which, in
the New Deal era, were also charged with implementing statutory law through
the interpretation of largely open-ended statutory provisions.
59. See Schacter, supra note 57.
6o. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 880-82 (1987) (discussing the
use of common law principles to inform constitutional law).
61. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 45, at 29.
62. As a modem example, consider the common law of cost-benefit analysis, itself an agency
creation with infrequent judicial oversight. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 129-48 (2005) (providing an overview).
63. See, e.g., In re Botany Worsted Mills, 27 N.L.K.B. 687 (194o); In re Am. Can Co., 13
N.L.R.B. 1252 (1939).
64. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
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There is an evident link between the realists' emphasis on the policy-driven
nature of interpretation and the New Deal's enthusiasm for administrators,
who were to be both expert and accountable. 6' The Marbury principle, calling
for independent judicial judgments about law, came under intense pressure as
a result of this enthusiasm. After President Roosevelt's triumph in the Supreme
Court in the late 1930s, courts began to signal that the executive would have
considerable law-interpreting power. A representative statement came in 1941,
when the Court upheld a controversial interpretation by the Department of the
Interior. The Court said that the judiciary may not "substitute its judgment for
that of the" agency, and emphasized that courts should not "absorb the
administrative functions to such an extent that the executive or legislative
agencies become mere fact-finding bodies deprived of the advantages of
prompt and definite action.', 66 It is significant that the Court suggested that
"administrative functions" include judgments of law and emphasized the need
for "prompt and definite action,67- an emphasis that is understandable on the
heels of Roosevelt's effort to take bold action in the face of the Great
Depression. 68 The need for prompt action has special importance in any period
of large-scale change, especially one in which national security is threatened.
In the same year, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure wrote:
Even on questions of law [independent judicial] judgment seems not to
be compelled. The question of statutory interpretation might be
approached by the court de novo and given the answer which the court
thinks to be the "right interpretation." Or the court might approach it,
somewhat as a question of fact, to ascertain, not the "right
interpretation," but only whether the administrative interpretation has
substantial support. Certain standards of interpretation guide in that
direction. Thus, where the statute is reasonably susceptible of more
than one interpretation, the court may accept that of the administrative
body. Again, the administrative interpretation is to be given weight-
not merely as the opinion of some men or even of a lower tribunal, but
as the opinion of the body especially familiar with the problems dealt
with by the statute and burdened with the duty of enforcing it. This
65. See the celebration of administrative authority in JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938), which might well be seen as a bridge between the realists and the architects
of the New Deal.
66. Grayv. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941).
67. Id.
68. For an overview, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BIL OF RIGHTS 35-53 (2004).
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may be particularly significant when the legislation deals with complex
matters calling for expert knowledge and judgment.6 9
In this light, a recognition of the executive's law-interpreting power can be
understood as a natural outgrowth of the twentieth-century shift from judicial
to executive branch lawmaking. The shift has been spurred by dual
commitments to specialized competence and democratic accountability- and
also by an understanding of the need for frequent changes in policy over time,
with new understandings of fact and new values as well. For banking,
telecommunications, foreign relations, energy, national security, labor
relations, and environmental protection - among many other areas - changing
circumstances often require agencies to adapt old provisions to unanticipated
problems. And if interpretation of unclear terms cannot operate without some
of the interpreter's own judgments, then the argument for executive
interpretation seems even more compelling.
4. Vacillations and Counterarguments
The period between 194o and 1984 offered a mixed picture with respect to
the deference question. In a number of cases, the Court seemed to indicate that
it would offer relatively little deference to agencies.7 ' The rise of the "hard
look" doctrine in the 197oS,7' spurred by judicial distrust of agency discretion,
could not easily coexist with deference to agency interpretations of law. A key
development was the election of President Reagan, whose administration in
relevant ways replicated that of President Roosevelt, notwithstanding the
obvious ideological differences between the two. In both cases, the executive
branch attempted to reorient the law in significant domains, with large-scale
rethinking of the approach offered by the preceding administration. It should
come as no surprise that in those same periods that President Reagan
attempted such rethinking, the Supreme Court firmly endorsed the law-
interpreting power of the executive branch. At the time, the Court itself may
have had limited ambitions for its decision in Chevron.72 But the decision was
69. ATTORNEY GEN.'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 77-8, at 90-
91 (1941) (internal citations omitted).
7o. The most important of these cases is Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402,411-15 (1971).
71. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509, 511 (1974).
72. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall
Papers, 23 ENvTL. L. REP. lo,6o6, 1o,613 (1993).
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soon viewed as a kind of revolution. It could be seen not only as a counter-
Marbury for the modern era but also as a kind of McCulloch v. Maryland,3
granting the executive broad discretion to choose its own preferred means to
promote statutory ends.
The discussion thus far has provided the ingredients of Chevron's
understanding of (implicit, fictional) legislative instructions on the deference
question. Expertise is often relevant, and the central questions often turn on
judgments of policy, for which accountability is crucial. In the face of rapidly
changing circumstances, the executive has significant advantages over the
courts, especially in light of the frequent need for speed and expedition. Of
course, plausible counterarguments can be made. The foundations of Chevron,
understood in the terms I have sketched out, are intensely pragmatic, and a
challenge might be mounted on pragmatic grounds. Suppose we believe that
executive agencies do not usually deploy technical expertise in a way that is
properly disciplined by political accountability. Suppose we think that such
agencies are often or largely controlled by well-organized private groups
hoping to redistribute wealth or opportunities in their favor.' 4 If claims of
agency "capture" are valid, deference to the executive might seem perverse.
And if agencies are thought to be systematically biased, then the argument for
independent judicial judgments on questions of law will seem much stronger.
We can easily imagine a parallel world, perhaps not unrecognizably
different from our own, in which there is a high risk of unreliable or biased
interpretations from the executive branch; perhaps courts can be trusted in
comparison. In that parallel world, independent judicial interpretation would
be the norm. Perhaps our world is, with respect to some agencies, akin to that
parallel world. If courts fear incompetence or bias, they will be less likely to
defer. Perhaps some institutions (the SEC? the White House itself?) deserve
more respect than others (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission? the
Bureau of Immigration Affairs?); the real world of judicial review undoubtedly
reflects different levels of deference to different agencies. Alternatively, it might
be tempting to distinguish between those decisions that are attributable to the
views of high-level officials, or those with technical expertise, and those
decisions that involve low-visibility judgments that do not require, or do not
benefit from, such expertise. As I have noted, political accountability and
technical expertise are both important, but they might not march hand-in-
hand. Perhaps politically accountable actors are not so interested in technical
73- 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Also see the superb discussion in Duffy, supra note 22, at 199-
203.
74. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211,
214-20 (1976).
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expertise; often they have agendas of their own.75 If the displacement of
common law courts by regulatory agencies is seen as an effort to ensure that
judgments are made by specialists rather than generalists, then a strong judicial
hand might, on occasion, be necessary to vindicate specialization against
politics.
Indeed, several state courts call for independent judicial review of agency
interpretations of law-and thus reject the executive's power to interpret state
law. State courts in New York follow an approach closely akin to pre-Chevron
law, deferring to agency interpretations of statutes to "varying degrees ...
depending upon the extent to which the interpretation relies upon the special
competence the agency is presumed to have developed." 76 In this view, "the
judiciary need not accord any deference to the agency's determination, and is
free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and
legislative intent."' California courts reject the notion that agencies have been
delegated authority to interpret statutes. 78 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme
Court notes that "courts are in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of
a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue."79
Few institutional judgments can be defended in the abstract. If agencies are
systematically biased, independent judicial review of legal judgments is
certainly easier to defend. Notwithstanding the counterarguments, the general
argument for judicial deference to executive interpretations rests on the
75. For a controversial account, see MOONEY, supra note 38, at 224-47.
76. Rosen v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 526 N.E.2d 25, 27-28 (N.Y. 1988).
77. In re Claim of Gruber, 674 N.E.2d 1354, 1358 (N.Y. 1996).
78. Yamaha Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 96o P.2d 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1998).
79- In re Petition for Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on Withdrawal of N. Haledon
Sch. Dist. from the Passaic County Manchester Reg' High Sch. Dist., 854 A.2d 327, 336
(N.J. 2004) (internal quotations marks omitted). The difference between the Chevron
approach and the contrasting approach of several state courts raises many puzzles. One
explanation would point to the nature of the federal system. In that system, the interest in
uniformity helps to support Chevron; an independent judicial role could result in the
balkanization of federal law, as different courts of appeals produce different interpretations.
This point has much less force within states because review by the state's highest court can
more easily sort out any such problems.
A second explanation is that state agencies may well suffer by comparison with federal
agencies, at least as a general rule. Perhaps such agencies are less likely to have the virtues
associated with technical expertise. Perhaps some such agencies are peculiarly vulnerable to
factional power; perhaps state courts are aware of that fact. If James Madison was right to
think that factional influence is more difficult to obtain against the nation than against the
states, see THE FEDERALIST No. 1O (James Madison), then an independent judicial judgment
is more important against state agencies than against their federal counterparts. If so, the
institutional calculations that support Chevron are weakened at the state level.
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undeniable claims that specialized competence is often highly relevant and that
political accountability plays a legitimate role in the choice of one or another
approach. A judicial effort to distinguish among agencies, or among levels of
visibility or uses of technical expertise, is not without appeal, and undoubtedly
some such effort sometimes plays a tacit role in judicial rulings. But if it were
made explicit, such an effort would lead to a more complicated system of
review, and it might also introduce biases and errors of the judges' own. If the
executive's judgment is evidently biased, or if it ignores relevant facts, then the
proper approach is not to abandon Chevron, but to invalidate that judgment
under Chevron's second step, or as unlawfully arbitrary8s A central goal of
Chevron is to ensure that within the realm of reasonableness, the key judgments
are made by policymaking officials, not by those with stricdy legal competence.
I have suggested that Chevron is this generation's Erie, and it is now time to
tighten the analogy, whose clarity is growing over time. Indeed, Chevron has
the same relationship to the last half of the twentieth century as Erie had to the
first half. Erie rested on a judicial recognition that the law is not "a brooding
omnipresence in the sky."'', When federal judges give content to the common
law, they are necessarily relying on judgments of their own. When the
Supreme Court concluded that there is no general federal common law, it
recognized this point, which is what led to the conclusion that in diversity
cases, federal judges should attend to the content of state law, not to their own
beliefs and commitments. In the federal common law cases decided before Erie,
judicial judgments about "what the law is" were not a matter of finding
something, but a product of judicial norms and values. Chevron is closely
parallel. When statutes are ambiguous, a judgment about their meaning rests
on no brooding omnipresence in the sky, but on assessments of both policy
and principle. There is no reason to allow those assessments to be made by
federal courts rather than executive officers. So, at least, Chevron holds.
C. The Real World of Chevron and "Policy Spaces"
How has Chevron affected the real world of executive and judicial action? E.
Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the EPA, has offered an informal
but illuminating account that strongly supports the argument I have sketched
so. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (striking down an agency decision as unlawfilly arbitrary).
81. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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on behalf of deference to the executive.82 Elliott reports that Chevron
"change[d] the way that we did business."8 Before Chevron, the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) within the EPA usually assumed that a statute was "a
prescriptive text having a single meaning, discoverable by specialized legal
training and tools. '' 84 In Elliott's view, the single meaning approach created a
special role for lawyers, one that "led to a great deal of implicit policy-
making.",8 But after Chevron, lawyers within the EPA ceased making "point
estimates," which presumed that environmental statutes had only one possible
meaning. Instead they "attempt[ed] to describe a permissible range of agency
policy-making discretion that arises out of a statutory ambiguity. '8 6 The result
was not a single meaning but a "policy space" containing a range of permissible
interpretive discretion. It follows that the "agency's policy-makers, not its
lawyers, should decide which of several different but legally defensible
interpretations to adopt.",8
In Elliott's account, "Chevron opened up and validated a policy-making
dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the agency should adopt for
policy reasons, rather than what interpretation the agency must adopt for legal
reasons."8 8 The result has been to "increase[] the weight given to the views of
air pollution experts in the air program office relative to the lawyers.",8 At the
same time, there has been a shift from an emphasis on legal texts to an
emphasis on consequences. "Chevron moved the debate from a sterile,
backward-looking conversation about Congress' nebulous and fictive intent to
a forward-looking, instrumental dialogue about what future effects the
proposed policy is likely to have."90 In short, "Chevron is significant for
reducing the relative power of lawyers within EPA and other agencies and for
increasing the power of other professionals."
9'
It is not clear whether the shift that Elliott describes has also occurred
within other agencies. But if the FCC is deciding whether or how to engage in
a. E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress,
Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2005).
83. Id. at ii.
84. Id.
8s. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis omitted).
go. Id. at 13.
91. Id.
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deregulation, if the President is deciding how to implement an authorization to
use force in response to the attacks of September 11,92 and if the Department of
the Interior is deciding on the reach of the Endangered Species Act, 93 there is
every reason to think that the job of lawyers, and of reviewing courts, is to
identify policy spaces and not to insist on point estimates.
The behavior of the executive is, of course, affected by the behavior of
courts, and there is a serious question whether Chevron is having the effect that
it was meant to have. Peter Schuck and Elliott found a modest but statistically
significant increase in affirmation rates in the immediate aftermath of Chevron.
In particular, they found an increase in affirmation rates from seventy-one
percent in the pre-Chevron year of 1984 to eighty-one percent in the post-
Chevron year of 1985. 9 4 They also found a dramatic decrease in judicial remands
on the ground that agencies erred on the law. 9 The combination of a higher
rate of affirmation with a lower rate of remands for errors of law strongly
suggests that Chevron had a significant impact.
96
92. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2663 (2005).
93. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
94. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 199o DUKE L.J. 984, 1031.
9g. Id. at 1032-33.
96. Id. at 1034. We must be careful, however, with findings of this sort, because litigants should
be expected to adjust their behavior to a post-Chevron world. Suppose that Chevron does
make it more difficult to convince a court that an agency violated the law. If this is so, then
litigants will not bring the cases they would have brought, and their success rate will change
accordingly. This possibility suggests a hypothesis: The rate of judicial validations of agency
interpretations of law should remain fairly constant over time, as litigants adjust their claims
to the prevailing deference principles. But there is a countervailing factor: After Chevron,
agencies might be willing to defend interpretations that they would not have made in a pre-
Chevron world. As a result of this factor too, it might be expected that the rate of validation
will remain constant. The general point is that because the mix of cases will shift, the world
cannot be held constant for a test of Chevron's effect.
Thomas Merrill offered an interesting picture of Supreme Court decisions involving
deference to executive agencies before and after Chevron. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, lOl YALE L.J. 969 (1992). In the three-year period before
Chevron, the Court decided forty-five cases on the deference question, accepting the agency's
view seventy-five percent of the time. Id. at 982 tbl.2. In the seven-year period after Chevron,
the Court decided ninety cases on that question, accepting the agency's view seventy percent
of the time. Id. at 981 tbl.i. Merrill concluded that Chevron did not produce an increase in
the level of deference to agency decisions. Id. at 984. But litigants on both sides may have
adjusted their behavior in accordance with Chevron; thus, despite appearances, the world
may not have remained constant between 1981 and 199o. Other variables might also account
for the shift, including changes in the substantive questions with which the Supreme Court
was confronted.
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A more recent study, based on more extensive data and conducted by
Thomas Miles and myself, offers a much more mixed picture, one that suggests
a continuing role for judicial policy judgments in overseeing executive
interpretations 97 -a role that greatly endangers the aspirations that underlie
Chevron itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas were
more likely to defer to a conservative agency decision than to a liberal one;
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg were more likely to defer to a
liberal decision than to a conservative one. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, taken as a group, showed a significantly higher deference
rate under the two Bush Administrations than under the Clinton
Administration. By contrast, Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
showed a significantly higher deference rate under President Clinton than
under the two Bush Administrations. (Interestingly, the deference rate of the
latter four Justices, taken as a whole, was higher under the two Bush
Administrations than the deference rate of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, taken as a whole, in the same periods; but the largest
difference was found under the Clinton Administration, when the deference
rates of the three conservative Justices plummeted and those of the four others
increased.) These figures reveal that within the Supreme Court, the political
commitments of the Justices continue to play a substantial role in review of
agency interpretations of law.
Among the lower courts, we investigated all published court of appeals
decisions between 199o and 2004, reviewing interpretations of law by the EPA
and the NLRB. We found that Democratic appointees were more likely to
uphold an interpretation under a Democratic administration than under a
Republican one; and that Republican appointees were more likely to uphold an
agency interpretation under a Republican administration than under a
Democratic one. Republican appointees upheld liberal interpretations less
often than conservative ones; Democratic appointees voted to uphold liberal
agency interpretations more often than conservative ones. Perhaps most
disturbingly, a Democratic appointee, sitting with two other Democratic
appointees, was far more likely to vote to uphold a liberal decision than a
conservative one - and a Republican appointee, sitting with two other
Republican appointees, was far more likely to vote to uphold a conservative
decision than a liberal one.
It is clear that even under Chevron, the political commitments of reviewing
judges continue to play a significant role in the decision whether to uphold
97. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHi. L. REv. 823 (2006).
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interpretations by the executive branch -and differences between Republican
and Democratic appointees suggest that policy disagreements are a key factor.
This evidence greatly fortifies the argument for a strong reading of Chevron.
There is no reason to think that the meaning of ambiguous statutes should
depend on the composition of the panel that litigants draw, or on whether a
Republican or Democratic President has appointed the majority on the
Supreme Court.
II. MARBURY'S REVENGE?
Since 1984, there have been serious attacks on the idea that the executive
has the power to say what the law is. In the last twenty years, efforts to cabin
the executive's power have taken several forms. I outline the principal efforts
here and explain why they should be rejected -with one important exception.
A. Chevron Step Zero (with a Note on Deference to the President)
In recent years, the most active debates over the executive's power to
interpret the law have involved "Chevron Step Zero"-the threshold inquiry
into whether the executive's law-interpreting power exists at all.'8 The Step
Zero inquiry has produced a great deal of confusion and complexity,
disappointing those who hoped that Chevron would simplify the law. 99
The key case is United States v. Mead Corp., °° which involved the legal
status of a tariff clarification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service. The Court
distinguished between Chevron cases, subject to the two-step framework, and
other kinds of cases, in which the agency's decision would be consulted but
would not receive the ordinary level of deference.' The Court's central
suggestion was that Chevron applies "when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority."' 2 An implicit delegation of interpretive authority
98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006).
99- See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REv. 1443 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 347 (2003).
100. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
loi. These cases follow Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and hence it is now possible
to distinguish between "Chevron deference" and "Skidmore deference."
102. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
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would be apparent if Congress "would expect the agency to be able to speak
with the force of law.' 10 3
What is motivating the Court to restrict Chevron's domain? The Court's
own rationale speaks of the absence of a congressional delegation of law-
interpreting power.'0 4 Perhaps there has been no delegation in cases in which
Chevron has been held not to apply. But recall that we are speaking here of
fictions, not of actual congressional instructions. In Mead and similar cases,
why is the refusal to defer to the executive the most sensible fiction, that is, the
most reasonable instruction to attribute to Congress? The Court might well be
reasoning that if an agency is not operating pursuant to formal procedures, it is
less likely to be entitled to deference, because the absence of such procedures
signals a lack of accountability and a risk of arbitrariness. ' Perhaps formal
procedures increase the likelihood that expertise will be properly applied;
perhaps they also ensure political constraints on agency discretion.
These suggestions are understandable, but there are two problems with the
resulting state of affairs. The first involves the burdens of decision. To say the
least, it is unfortunate if litigants and courts must work extremely hard to
know whether a decision by the executive is entitled to deference.1°6 The
second and more fundamental problem involves institutional comparisons.
Even when an agency's decision is not preceded by formal procedures, there is
no reason to think that courts are in a better position than agencies to resolve
statutory ambiguities. For the future, Mead should not be taken to establish
anything like a presumption against Chevron-style deference in cases in which
the agency has not proceeded through formal procedures. Instead Mead should
be seen as an unusual case in an exceedingly unusual setting, in which low-
level administrators were required to produce thousands of rulings, in a way
that undermined the view that the executive branch should receive deference.
A narrow understanding of Mead would continue to allow deference to be
applied to many agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures.10 7 Most
importantly, that narrow understanding would suggest that the President
himself is entitled to deference in his interpretations of law, even if he has not
followed formal procedures. If Congress delegates authority to the President,
103. Id. at 229.
104. In the same vein, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 918-22 (2006) (rejecting the agency
interpretation on the ground that Congress had not delegated law-interpreting authority).
105. See Bressman, supra note 99.
106. Consider, for example, the exceedingly complex debates in Gonzales. The majority
concluded that Congress did not delegate law interpreting power, 126 S. Ct. at 918-22, while
Scalia concluded that Congress did delegate such power, id. at 936-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. For more detailed discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 98.
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then Congress presumably also entitles him to construe ambiguities as he sees
fit, subject to the general requirement of reasonableness.1°S
B. Pure Questions of Law
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,'°9 the Court suggested that "a pure question of
statutory construction" is "for the courts to decide,"' 0 and that such a "pure
question" must be treated differently from the question of interpretation that
arises when an agency is applying a standard "to a particular set of facts." 1
Taken on its face, Cardoza-Fonseca seems to be an effort to restore the pre-
Chevron status quo by asserting the primacy of the judiciary on purely legal
questions. And in fact, Justice Scalia construed the Court's opinion in exactly
this manner, objecting that the Court's "discussion is flatly inconsistent" with
Chevron."2 On this count Justice Scalia was clearly correct. The key point- and
my main contention here -is that even when purely legal questions are raised,
purely legal competence may not be enough to resolve them. Justice Scalia's
concurrence has triumphed, in the sense that there is no separate category of
cases involving purely legal questions.
C. Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has divided on the question of whether Chevron
applies to jurisdictional questions,"3 an issue that remains unsettled in the
lower courts.1 4 If courts are entitled to make independent judgments about
1o8. See Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41, 64 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)
("The applicability of Chevron to presidential interpretations is apparently unsettled, but it is
interesting to note that this would be an easy case had the EWSAA provided that, say, the
Secretary of State may exercise the authority conferred under section 1503. It is puzzling why
the case should be so much harder when the authority is given to the Secretary's boss.")
(citations omitted).
lO9. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
iio. Id. at 446.
m1. Id. at 448.
112. Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for deference to jurisdictional judgments);
id. at 388-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing against such deference).
114. See, e.g., United Transp. Union-Ill. Legislative Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d 606 (7th
Cir. 1999) (refusing to defer on a jurisdictional issue); Cavert Acquisition Co. v. NLRB, 83
F.3d 598 (3d Cir. 1996) (deferring on a jurisdictional issue involving the definition of
"employee"); Alaska v. Babbitt, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1995) (deferring on a jurisdictional
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jurisdictional issues, the executive would be deprived of law-interpreting
power in many of the areas in which it would most like to exert that power.
The importance of such an exception would be difficult to overstate.
Any exemption of jurisdictional questions is vulnerable on two grounds.
First, the line between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions is far
from clear, and hence any exemption threatens to introduce much more
complexity into the deference inquiry. Second, and far more importantly, the
considerations that underlie Chevron support its application to jurisdictional
questions. If an agency is asserting or denying jurisdiction over some area, it is
either because democratic forces are leading it to do so or because its own
specialized competence justifies its jurisdictional decision. Suppose, for
example, that the FDA is asserting jurisdiction over tobacco products"' or that
the EPA is asserting jurisdiction over greenhouse gases.1 6 Any such decision
would be driven by some combination of political and technical judgments. So
long as the statute is ambiguous, the executive should have the power to
construe its jurisdictional limits as it (reasonably) sees fit.
D. Major Questions
Does Chevron apply to "major" questions?'17 The Court signaled a possible
negative answer in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,"'s the tobacco
case with which I began this Essay. Much of the opinion emphasized the wide
range of tobacco-specific legislation enacted by Congress in the last few
decades -legislation that, in the Court's view, should "preclude an
interpretation of the FDCA that grants the FDA jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products."" 9 But the Court added an important closing word. Chevron, the
Court noted, is based on "an implicit delegation," but in "extraordinary cases,"
courts may have reason to "hesitate before concluding that Congress has
issue involving the definition of "public lands"). A recent discussion can be found in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2004), in which the court, after
finding a Step One violation, notes that "it seems highly unlikely that a responsible
Congress would implicitly delegate to an agency the power to define the scope of its own
power," and then suggests that Mead (!) provides the appropriate framework. Id. at 199-
200.
115. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
i6. Cf. Nicholle Winters, Note, Carbon Dioxide: A Pollutant in the Air, but Is the EPA Correct
That It Is Not an "Air Pollutant?," 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1996 (2004).
117. This question is explored in more detail in Sunstein, supra note 98.
118. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
9ig. Id. at 155.
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intended such an implicit delegation." 12 The Court added, "we are confident
that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."
1 21
The Court seems to be saying that for decisions of great "economic and
political significance," an implicit delegation ought not to be found. And if an
exception exists for major questions, then the executive's power of
interpretation faces a large limitation. Indeed, the EPA has seized on Brown &
Williamson to contend that it lacks the power to regulate greenhouse gases.'
The problem is that there is no sufficient justification for the conclusion that
major questions should be resolved judicially rather than administratively. To
say the least, no simple line separates minor or interstitial from major
questions. An insistence on such a line would raise doubts about an array of
decisions, including Chevron itself; the question in that case, involving the
definition of "source," had "economic and political significance" and is
plausibly characterized as quite major. In any case, expertise and
accountability, the linchpins of Chevron's legal fiction, are highly relevant to the
resolution of major questions. Contrary to Justice Breyer's suggestion,'2 3 there
is no reason to think that Congress would want courts, rather than agencies, to
resolve major questions.
Assume, for example, that the relevant statutes in Brown & Williamson
could plausibly be read to support or to forbid the agency action at issue. If so,
the argument for judicial deference would be exceptionally strong. In Brown &
Williamson, the FDA was taking action to reduce one of the nation's most
serious public health problems in a judgment that had a high degree of public
visibility and required immersion in the subject at hand. Was it really best to
understand Congress as having delegated the resolution of the underlying
questions to federal courts? Which federal courts? Nominated by which
President?
A different version of the "major questions" exception would have greater
appeal. On this alternative view, the executive should not be allowed to move
the law in fundamentally new directions without congressional approval.1 4 In
insisting on this point, courts would not be displacing policy decisions by the
izo. Id. at 159.
121. Id. at 16o.
12. See J. Christopher Baird, Note, Trapped in the Greenhouse?: Regulating Carbon Dioxide After
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 54 DuKE L.J. 147, 157-58 (2004); Winters,
supra note 116, at 1997-2001.
123. See STEPHEN BREYER, AcTIVE LIBERTY 107 (2005).
124. I am grateful to Jed Rubenfeld for pressing this point.
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executive branch. They would be attempting instead to require the relevant
changes to be made by Congress, not by the executive in the absence of clear
legislative authorization. Perhaps Brown & Williamson can be understood in
these terms. ' The central idea, rooted in Article I, is that legislative power is
vested in Congress, and massive shifts in direction must be specifically
authorized by the national lawmaker. As we shall soon see, this claim is on the
right track insofar as it emphasizes the relevance of nondelegation concerns to
the Chevron framework.2
6
As described thus far, however, the "major questions" argument runs into
two problems. First, the distinction between "major" changes and less "major"
ones remains ambiguous. There is no metric here for making the necessary
distinctions. Second, it is entirely legitimate for the executive to make "major"
changes insofar as it is doing so through reasonable interpretation of genuinely
ambiguous statutes. The alternative position would freeze existing
interpretations, forbidding their alteration until Congress called for it. A
position of this sort would badly disserve modern government and its needs,
which are far better satisfied by allowing the executive to adopt reasonable
interpretations of statutory ambiguities. Nothing in Article I of the
Constitution argues otherwise. The best use of nondelegation concerns lies
elsewhere.
E. Nondelegation Canons and the Limits ofExecutive Power
My general argument has been in favor of an expansive view of the
executive's power to interpret the law. But there is one area in which that
power is properly limited-an area involving interpretive principles that
require Congress to decide certain issues explicitly. In this area, an exception to
the Chevron principle, calling for invalidation of agency decisions at Step One,
is entirely appropriate.
It is often said that Congress must speak with clarity, most obviously in
connection with the nondelegation doctrine. 27 In fact, my argument on behalf
125. And so too for MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994), which
prohibited the FCC from adopting a large-scale deregulatory initiative. The Court
emphasized that the proposed initiative would amount to a "radical or fundamental change
in the Act's tariff-filing requirement," id. at 229, and that "it is highly unlikely that Congress
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially,
rate-regulated to agency discretion," id. at 231.
126. See infra Section II.E.
127. For general discussion and critique, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721 (2002).
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of judicial deference to executive interpretations of law might seem to be in
tension with that doctrine. On a widely held view, Article I of the Constitution
forbids Congress from "delegating" its power to anyone else, and open-ended
grants of authority are unconstitutional. 's Though the Supreme Court has not
invoked the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a federal statute since 1935, '29
the Court continues to pay lip service to the doctrine and to hold it in reserve
for extreme cases. 3 Why has the Court been so reluctant to use the doctrine to
strike down statutes? One reason is that the idea of nondelegation is difficult to
enforce, requiring difficult judgments of degree. The relevant question is how
much discretion is too much, and there are no simple standards for answering
this question. '31 There are also doubts about the constitutional pedigree of the
doctrine and about whether it would improve or impair American
government.'32
The nondelegation doctrine now operates as a tool of statutory
construction, suggesting a presumption in favor of narrow rather than open-
ended grants of authority. '33 It is tempting to object to Chevron on
nondelegation grounds, because the decision grants the executive the authority
to interpret the very statutes that limit its power. But there is a serious problem
with this objection. If the executive is denied interpretive authority, that
authority is given to the judiciary instead, and that step would hardly reduce
the nondelegation concern; it would merely grant courts the power to make
judgments of policy and principle. If anything, an allocation of policymaking
authority to the executive seems to reduce the nondelegation concern, precisely
because the executive, far more than courts, has a measure of accountability.
Nonetheless, there is a set of cases in which courts have denied the
executive the authority to interpret the law, on the ground that the key
decisions must be explicitly made by the national lawmaker. Most importantly,
the executive is not permitted to construe statutes so as to raise serious
128. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 10-22 (1993); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327(2002).
129. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
130. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
131. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing problems with judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine).
132. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 127.
133. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (198o).
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constitutional doubts."' This principle is far more ambitious than the modest
claim that a statute will be construed so as to be constitutional. Instead it
means that the executive is forbidden to adopt interpretations that are
constitutionally sensitive, even if those interpretations might ultimately be
upheld. So long as the statute is unclear and the constitutional question
serious, Congress must decide to raise that question via explicit statement.3 '
Why does this idea overcome the executive's power of interpretation? The
reason is that we are speaking of a kind of nondelegation canon-one that
attempts to require Congress to make its instructions exceedingly clear and
does not permit the executive to make constitutionally sensitive decisions on its
own.13 6 Other interpretive principles, also serving as nondelegation canons,
trump Chevron as well, because they require a clear statement from the national
legislature. Consider the notion that unless Congress has spoken with clarity,
the executive is not permitted to interpret a statute to apply retroactively.
137
Here too, a nondelegation canon is at work: Only Congress may compromise
the interest, long honored by Anglo-American traditions, in avoiding
retroactive application of law. Or consider the idea that the executive cannot
interpret statutes and treaties unfavorably to Native Americans.13 s This idea is
plainly an outgrowth of the complex history of relations between the United
States and Native American tribes, which have semi-sovereign status; it is an
effort to ensure that any unfavorable outcome will be a product of an explicit
judgment of the national legislature.
In areas ranging from broadcasting to the war on terror, the nondelegation
canons operate as constraints on the interpretive discretion of the executive.
139
What emerges is therefore a simple structure. In general, the executive is
134. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
172-73 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-78 (1988).
13S. AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 179-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (striking down executive
interpretation under Step Two to avoid First Amendment problems).
136. I discuss this idea more generally in Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L.
REv. 315 (2000).
137. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 2o8 (1988).
138. See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 66o (9 th Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that courts "are
required to construe statutes favoring Native Americans liberally in their favor"); Ramah
Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461 (ioth Cir. 1997) (grounding a canon of
statutory construction favoring Native Americans in "the unique trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians"); Tyonek Native Corp. v. Sec'y of the Interior, 836 F.2d
1237, 1239 (9 th Cir. 1988) (referring in dicta to the canon of statutory construction that
"statutes benefiting Native Americans should be construed liberally in their favor").
139. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 2670-72.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2609
HeinOnline  -- 115 Yale L.J.  2609 2005-2006
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
permitted to interpret ambiguous statutes as it sees fit, subject to the
constraints of reasonableness. The only limitations are found in the
nondelegation canons. The resulting framework is admirably well suited to the
needs of modern government; it grants the executive exactly the degree of
discretion that it deserves to possess.
CONCLUSION
Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that resolution of
statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle. The
allocation of law-interpreting power to the executive fits admirably well with
the twentieth-century shift from common law courts to regulatory
administration. Of course, the executive must follow the law when it is clear,
and agency decisions are invalid if they are genuinely arbitrary. I have also
emphasized that in some domains, Congress must provide explicit
authorization to executive officials. When the executive is raising serious
constitutional questions, statutory ambiguity does not constitute adequate
authorization, and the executive branch should not be permitted to act on its
own. But if the governing statute is ambiguous, the executive should usually be
permitted to interpret it as it reasonably sees fit.
Unfortunately, courts have occasionally attempted to reassert their primacy
in the interpretation of statutory law; as a result, the political convictions of
federal judges continue to play a role in judicial review of agency
interpretations. These efforts should be firmly resisted. The meaning of
statutory enactments is no brooding omnipresence in the sky. Chevron is our
Erie, and much of the time, it is emphatically the province and duty of the
executive branch to say what the law is.
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